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ABSTRACT: One of the strategies journalists use to attract their audience towards a news item is the 
suggestion of controversy. The terms by which issues are created influences the way discussions 
evolve. I will examine how such controversies can be part of an argumentative situation, and I will 
examine whether any evaluation standard can be developed in this matter. The style figure antithesis, as 
it is explored in Jeanne Fahnestock’s work, is a useful tool in considering invention, form and function 
of controversy and opposition. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The strategies parties develop in order to become a public issue and to be in the news 
are manifold. Journalists in their turn try to attract attention to the chosen news issues 
by presenting their items as attractively as possible and thus to enhance their 
relevance. One of the strategies often used to seduce the audience into watching or 
reading a news item is the suggestion of controversy: the suggestion of fighting 
parties has a certain appeal to it. Especially popular mass media seem to suffer from 
this rhetorical strategy. This strategy is being criticized by many, as the terms by 
which issues are created is indeed crucial for the way the arguments develop and the 
discussion does or does not evolve.  
“Our job is to articulate and sort out what practitioners think they are doing 
and to account for how, or whether, the activity thus conceptualized works to achieve 
the purposes for which it is pursued. The concept of issue needs just such an 
articulation, sorting-out and accounting” Jean Goodwin (2002, p. 81) pointed out. 
Much work still needs to be done on the why, what and how of issues. In this paper, I 
will point out some aspects of controversy, and the ways in which it can become part 
of an argumentative situation.  
In news reporting, controversy is generally presented or staged as being “just 
there”: parties are fighting over the right interpretation of a phenomenon, the right 
solution for a problem, the right decision for a community. But obviously, not all 
controversies are being reported upon, for all kinds of reasons. And on the other hand, 
it is questionable whether reporting about issues by presenting them as controversial 
is good argumentation and hence good journalism. 
Deborah Tannen is one of the many scholars that are concerned about the 
appeal of controversy. Apparently, media believe that controversy is interesting and 
the absence of controversy is dull. But news items presented as if they were a fight 
affect the way we think about them, and affect in their turn the events themselves: 
reporting on battles is at the same time fomenting them. Moreover: “Framing news as 
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a fight between two sides often results in needed information not getting out – and 
even false information getting spread” (Tannen 1998, p. 33). 
One of the many causes for this “argument culture” is language itself. In her 
comment on the power of catchy soundbites, Tannen argues: “Language is not 
something static that we learn as children once and for all but a constantly evolving 
organism. […] citizens pick up not only the ideas they read and hear but the attitude, 
the tone, the very wording. The writer of a snappy headline or jazzy story is 
suggesting to citizens how they should regard their government, the world, and one 
another” (Tannen 1998, p. 91). Tannen does recognize the influence of style and 
wording, but she does this in the usual context of warning us for the dangerous effects 
of it. 
Of course, some conflicts are “just there”. And some of them definitely should 
be in the news. But reporting on them is often seen as a matter of simply describing1, 
not a matter of thoughtful writing. James Crosswhite, who conceptualizes argument as 
a form of social conflict, and as such an alternative to arbitrary power and violence, 
claims that thinking of argument as conflict is one way of being interested in 
discovery (Crosswhite 1996, p. 104). “Conflict is much more generative, all-
pervading, and constructive than we are usually inclined to think. Considered from 
one angle, the angle of argumentation, conflict is a way of having peace and renewal” 
(Crosswhite 1996, p. 129). To Crosswhite, conflicts exist before they are brought into 
language:  
 
Claims and questions do not appear out of nowhere as the result of a school exercise in 
invention. Rather, they are explicit forms of claimings and resistances to those claimings that 
already surround us and permeate us. Sometimes we have to ‘discover’ these conflicts in the 
sense of making them explicit as claims and questions about those claims. However, the 
conflicts are already there in implicit and sometimes explicit ways. When certain social-
historical and ethical conditions are met, and where we have the right sort of perception and 
imagination, we can bring these conflicts into language with the hope of examining, exploring, 
clarifying, and perhaps resolving them reasonably (Crosswhite 1996, pp. 109-110). 
 
To “discover” the preargumentative conflicts, Crosswhite clearly prefers “the 
right sort of perception and imagination” to “a school exercise in invention”2. Both 
Tannen and Crosswhite deal with the way conflict and opposition can or cannot be 
dealt with in reasonable language, but at the same time they implicitly distrust the 
possibilities offered by language itself. And precisely this aspect of language needs 
some more considering. I will interpret Fahnestocks work on rhetorical figures in 
general and on antithesis in particular in order to search for alternatives to the idea of 
controversies as being “just there”, or as a style and language “problem”. I will link 
the idea of controversy to the rhetorical principle of invention. The inventive 
possibilities generated by the figures in general and the figure antithesis in particular 
are explored by Jeanne Fahnestock in the field of science. But nothing prevents us 
from adapting this to invention in the media, a field that often considers itself to be far 
from rhetoric. That is the reason why I will also focus on the sporadic claims she 
makes about the public opinion, education, or the mass media. 
                                                 
1 For a survey of work on fact construction, see Jonathan Potter (1996) Representing Reality. 
Discourse, rhetoric and social construction, Sage Publications, London.  
2 At some point, Crosswhite does mention the notion that in our very language use we carry hidden 
conflicts with us: “If one believes that there should or could be a form of discourse which is completely 
transparent, and that reason requires such a discourse, one will find here a fatal flaw in argumentation” 
(Crosswhite 1996, p. 114). 
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2. ARGUMENT IS WAR 
 
Metaphor 
 
The metaphorical structure “argument is war” is a central issue in the work of Lakoff 
and Johnson (1980). Expressions like ‘attacking a view’, or ‘choosing a strategy to 
defend a claim’ are not only ways of talking, as they are usually conceived by 
philosophers and linguists, but they structure our very concept of arguing. According 
to Lakoff and Johnson, the conceptual systems we use in thinking and acting can be 
traced back in our language use. And that is basically and systematically 
metaphorical. “The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind 
of things in terms of another” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, p. 5). Moreover, it is an 
open concept: “So when we say that a concept is structured by a metaphor, we mean 
that it is partially structured and that it can be extended in some ways but not others” 
(Lakoff and Johnson 1980, p. 13). The openness of this structure is somewhat 
enthusiastically demonstrated as such: 
 
We have by no means exhausted all the cross-metaphorical coherences involving argument 
metaphors. Consider, for example, the extensive network of coherences based on the argument 
is war metaphor. Here it is possible to win or lose, to attack and defend, to plan and pursue a 
strategy, etc. Here arguments may be fortresses via the building metaphor, so that we can 
launch an attack on an argument, knock holes in it, tear it down an destroy it. Arguments may 
also be missiles, via the container metaphor. Thus we can offer the challenge “shoot!” and the 
argument in reply may be right on target and hit the mark. In defense you can try to shoot 
down your opponent’s argument (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, p. 105). 
 
This approach is rhetorical, not only because the metaphor trope is considered 
to be a central issue, but also because it links metaphor to conceptual evolution and 
social action. Metaphors are dynamic: they can create new meanings, and also they 
can “sanction actions, justify inferences, and help us set goals” (Lakoff and Johnson 
1980, p. 142). This insight inspires the authors to suggest new ways of defining words 
and concepts. They claim that definitions of objects are interactional (and not just 
properties), and that categories are open-ended, which gives them the possibility of 
recategorization. Lakoff and Johnson try to escape from the objectivism/subjectivism 
dichotomy by their “experientalism” that claims that understanding takes place in 
terms of entire domains of experience and not in terms of “isolated concepts” (Lakoff 
and Johnson 1980, p. 117). 
Another rhetorical aspect of their project is the fact that they account for 
choice, in that a rhetorical approach always implies accounting for what has been said 
and what not. “In allowing us to focus on one aspect of a concept (eg. the battling 
aspects of arguing), a metaphorical concept can keep us from focussing on other 
aspects of the concept that are inconsistent with that metaphor” (Lakoff and Johnson 
1980, p. 10). When we mention the sexy blond guy we invited to our dinner party, or 
a renowned cellist, or a Marxist, we highlight and downplay different aspects of this 
one person. The “true” statements we make are based on the ways we categorize 
things. Categories are not fixed entities, but instead, we choose categories in function 
of our perceptions and purposes. The truth of a statement will always be relative to the 
way the category is understood for our purposes in a given context (Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980, p. 163-164). 
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In fact, Lakoff and Johnson explicitly go into Aristotle’s Rhetoric when they 
are showing how metaphor can help us escape from the rigid opposition between 
objectivism and subjectivism, always defining themselves in opposition to the other. 
“But although Aristotle’s theory of how metaphors work is the classic view, his praise 
of metaphor’s ability to induce insight was never carried over into modern 
philosophical thought. With the rise of empirical science as a model for truth, the 
suspicion of poetry and rhetoric became dominant in Western thought, with metaphor 
and other figurative devices becoming objects of scorn again” (Lakoff and Johnson 
1980, p. 190). Their “experientalist synthesis” unites reason and imagination, and 
proposes some kind of “imaginative rationality” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, p. 193).  
Their ideas have been criticized by many; also by Crosswhite, who argues that 
war and argumentation do share a process of conflict that is remarkably similar, but 
that physical conflict is by no means the ground of argumentation. “If anything, it 
would be more proper to say that argumentation is the ground of physical conflict, and 
that war and fighting would be impossible without it” (Crosswhite 1996, p. 129). But 
yet, their work has inspired many scholars (see further), and it is important to notice 
here that the authors go into the possibilities of metaphor in giving meaning to form 
(Lakoff and Johnson 1980, p. 126). 
 
Figures 
 
The heuristic possibilities created by analogy that allows for thinking one thing in 
terms of another are taken much farther by Jeanne Fahnestock in her work on the 
rhetorical figures. 
Fahnestock’s work adds to the impressive amount of studies on the rhetoric of 
science. Yet, most of it is concerned with the questions of how scientists use 
language, how they argue, and in what way the structure of language leads them into 
certain ways of thinking and arguing. A rhetorical analysis of a specific case, author, 
text, movement, is used to evaluate its cultural or historical value and to reveal the 
generative power of language. It looks at both formal elements and historical 
circumstances. 
Fahnestock has set a different goal to her work: she wants to explore the 
influence of the rhetorical structures that constitute widely applicable lines of 
argument. The only structure that has received much attention is metaphor, but far less 
work has been done on the conceptual and inventive power of other figures of speech, 
like antithesis, gradatio, incrementum, antimetabole, ploche, and polyptoton. “Thus 
rhetoric is used in this study to illuminate scientific arguments, but, more important 
here, scientific arguments are used to illuminate rhetoric” (Fahnestock 1999, p. vii). 
Work on rhetorical theory can draw from an exceptionally rich tradition: 
 
Rhetoric is still a term so elided from general educated awareness that it retains only a 
pejorative connotation as verbal deceit. But it represents the discipline that constituted higher 
learning in antiquity, and it remained a major portion of the university curriculum from the 
Middle Ages through the eighteenth century. The rhetorical tradition in classical and early 
modern texts is based on the conviction that there are generic skills of argument, regardless of 
subject matter. Rhetoric has also been valued as a teachable art, at once general and 
generative, which has advice to offer on everything form phrasing and premise formation to 
methods of behaviour and action in the world. The rhetorical tradition is, furthermore, highly 
coherent across its 2500-year history, so that it is possible to trace similar terms across the 
centuries and put texts from widely different eras into conversation with each other 
(Fahnestock 1999, p. viii). 
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All along, writers in the rhetorical tradition have provided important 
“taxonomies of naturally occurring verbal devices and of lines and methods of 
argument, and, more important, of the connection between or even identity of these 
two” (Fahnestock 1999, p. vii). 
Especially the heuristic function of rhetoric apparently has lost its former 
importance, and that’s another reason for Fahnestock’s interest in earlier theories 
concerning style and argument. The figures of speech hold a central position in 
rhetorical theory, she claims. It’s her point to study the constitutive power of figures 
and see how they are epitomized in various lines of argument. Metaphor is widely 
seen as basic to linguistic and cognitive processes by now, but this point hasn’t been 
made yet for the other figures of speech. They are still considered to be some 
decoration on the plain cloth of language, but not the fabric itself (Fahnestock 1999, p. 
xii). 
One of her goals is “to weaken the old misconception that the domain of 
rhetoric does not extend to the sciences since rhetorical invention presumably 
prescribes only the reassembly of conventional truths, while scientific invention 
involves the discovery of new truths” (Fahnestock 1999, p. xi). The promotion of 
inquiry was the so-called reason why 17th-century scientists deliberately exaggerated 
their break with the prevailing intellectual and pedagogical tradition, i.e. rhetoric. Yet, 
the interactions between writing, thought, and operations in creative scientific activity 
are far more subtle than that. “But language does do much of our thinking for us, even 
in the sciences, and rather than being an unfortunate contamination, its influence has 
been productive historically, helping individual thinkers generate concepts and 
theories that can then be put to the test” (Fahnestock 1999, p. xi). 
 
It is also hoped that this study, like others in the rhetoric of science, will help to chip away at 
the profound division in our culture between science and the humanities. We have so divided 
these two enterprises that we sort texts, disciplines, thinking styles, types of mind, and even 
children according to whether they belong in one domain or the other. Science students often 
believe they can dispense with the verbal arts, and humanities students avoid science. The 
polemics of the scientific revolution in the seventeenth century, debasing rhetoric to elevate 
science, have been too successful. Yet if the thinking styles and language habits of the two are 
essentially similar, as a demonstration of the figural patterning necessary to many scientific 
arguments suggests, there is little point in such division. We might pursue instead a ‘one 
mind’ hypothesis, that the same cognitive/verbal skills serve any subject of inquiry. What 
matters is that these generic skills be strengthened. The consequences for our educational 
system could be profound (Fahnestock 1999, p. xii). 
  
Fahnestock sees different reasons for the dominance of metaphor in language 
analysis and in studies of the mind that build on studies of language3. She mentions 
the disciplines of literary studies, linguistics, psychology, philosophy, education, and 
work on metaphor by historians, theologians, sociologists, legal theorists, and even 
scientists. According to Fahnestock, work on metaphor is so popular because it allows 
scholars and researchers to believe they have a window on a fundamental, generative 
cognitive process. In science studies, hidden metaphors are supposed to count for 
scientific creativity, and scientific revolutions are considered to be metaphoric 
revolutions. Reasons for this fascination might be that metaphoric creativity supports 
the “romantic” vision of inspiration, genius and innovation, and the idea that poets 
                                                 
3 “As a fundamental mechanism in language and thinking, metaphor has been championed by the 
Belgian structuralists of Group µ; nominated by historian Hayden White as master of the four master 
tropes; and identified by the cognitive linguists and philosophers, George Lakoff, Mark Johnson, and 
Mark Turner, as the principle underlying all conceptual systems” (Fahnestock 1999, p. 4). 
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and scientists are in a way united by metaphor. But more importantly, metaphor as an 
epistemological construct is an identifiable, formal device. It can be pointed out and 
pinned down. And moreover, examples of the role of metaphor in science are 
numerous. “Despite these compelling cases, the fixation on metaphor […] 
overemphasizes the role of analogy in human reasoning and begs the question of 
whether all or even most scientific cases can be “explained” by a core metaphor” 
(Fahnestock 1999, p. 5-6). The obsession with metaphor narrows down the much 
richer rhetorical tradition that provides for other possible conceptual and heuristic 
resources that are formally identifiable as well4. 
Any attempt to track down the history of the figures of speech immediately 
reveals another reason why the relatively small and clear category of tropes has been 
so popular until now: it is impossible to define or categorize all the material that has 
been brought together over the ages. Maybe the only thing all such devices have in 
common is that they have been listed as a figure in rhetoric. In the twentieth century, 
the ancient category of figures of thought is barely noticed, and rhetoricians only 
work on the categories of tropes and schemes. Yet, “It would be misleading to suggest 
that these earliest treatments represent precise theoretical distinctions on the basis of a 
linguistic rationale that has since been lost. A neat division among the tropes as 
semantic, the schemes as syntactic, and the figures of thought as pragmatic holds only 
roughly when it is compared with the actual lists in the manuals” (Fahnestock 1999, p. 
11).  
Renaissance rhetoricians offer a wide variety of categories. According to 
Fahnestock, the only thing they have in common is their struggle with the matching of 
verbal forms on the one hand and discourse functions or speech acts on the other 
(Fahnestock 1999, p. 14). Theories of figuration in the first place try to explain and 
categorize individual figures. But when it comes to figuration in general and the 
notion that figures form a departure from normal language, we find a long history of 
theories. Indeed, what could that norm be? Even Aristotle sees figures as normal, in 
the sense that they are accepted, not abnormal language. And what does it mean to 
claim that figures are not typical? Fahnestock is sceptic about the possibility of 
providing statistic evidence of typical (literal) versus not typical (figurative) language 
without taking its context into consideration. In the nineteenth century, Fontanier 
seems to find a solution for this problem in his claim that figurative language is a 
departure from the simple “degree zero” language.  
Yet, these definitions all carry an implicit division of language in them: literal 
language on the one hand, and figurative language on the other hand, as if one can 
switch back and forth between two levels of reading and understanding. This either/or 
- state theory doesn’t lead us very far5. Fahnestock then changes the focus to the more 
relevant question what the substitutions really are for.  
 
It cannot be answered from a formal perspective according to what syntactic or semantic 
substitutions have presumably been made; it has to be investigated on the functional side of 
the connection, by asking what speakers or writers may be accomplishing by using figures, 
even when unaware, and by what effect figures apparently have on listeners or readers 
(Fahnestock 1999, p. 17). 
 
                                                 
4 “As Gérard Genette complained in ‘Rhetoric Restrained’, the tendency among commentators on 
rhetoric (especially French commentators) from the eighteenth century on has been to reduce the whole 
art to the figures, the figures to the tropes, and the tropes to metaphor” (Fahnestock 1999, p. 6). 
5 It can even be considered to be a reduction from the simultaneous fourfold senses of ancient Biblical 
hermeneutics (Fahnestock 1999, p.20).  
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As a whole, value-added theories of the figures have dominated in the rhetorical 
tradition6. The figures are considered to be sources of emotion, charm, vividness, 
force, vivacy or elegance7. This supposed difference between unmarked and marked 
language has pushed the figures to the exclusive field of markers of the literary text, 
and forgot about any possible other function (Fahnestock 1999, p. 20). 
Also, it is impossible to set an exclusive figure/emotion connection, not only 
because emotion is very much a function of the larger rhetorical situation of an 
utterance, but also because it is unlikely that anything at all could be said or heard 
without involving (any) more or (maybe) less remarkable emotion. “The analysis 
undertaken so far resists the assumption that an emotional dimension can be factored 
out of an expression leaving a ‘content’ behind. Although the profound division in the 
Western tradition between emotion and reason is not easily challenged, the 
assumption of separability is worth some probing” (Fahnestock 1999, p. 21-22). How 
could in the aposiopesis figure, for instance, where the speaker stops in mid-sentence, 
the emotional and argumentative value be separated? The suggested inexpressibility 
works both on the emotional and material level. 
The overall problem with value-added theories is that they impose a 
distinction between figurative and non-figurative language. All the work on added 
values reveals important functions of the figures, but none of them is exclusively 
constitutive of a text’s many meanings. Rather, Fahnestock proposes, figure functions 
can be considered to exist within a continuum of expressive possibilities. 
Figures can also be understood as epitomes of lines of reasoning, as the formal 
embodiments of certain ideational or persuasive functions. They can be studied not for 
what they are but for what they do well: to express iconically. “Associating certain 
verbal figures with general lines of reasoning, called ‘topics’ in the rhetorical 
tradition, also assumes that it is possible to define these lines or arguments in the first 
place, a notion that for contemporary readers with no exposure to rhetoric may seem 
as odd as the figures themselves” (Fahnestock 1999, p. 23). A traditional lexicon for 
lines of argument disappeared together with the cognate notion of the figures as 
epitomes of those lines. This notion of the generic skills of rhetoric conflicts with our 
ideas of spontaneity of invention based on complicated cognitive processes, and with 
the confinement of procedures of method and argument to the specific disciplines or 
professions. But the popularity of the metaphor to generate analogical reasoning could 
be a starting point for the assumption that human reasoning can follow many more 
lines than analogy alone. 
 
What does it mean to say that a verbal figure epitomizes a line of reasoning? An epitome, from 
the Greek verb meaning “to cut short or cut upon” is in one sense a summary, an abstract 
containing all the essential parts of a larger work or text, and, in a slightly different sense, it is 
a representative or exemplary selection from and then substitution for something longer. The 
figure, then, is a verbal summary that epitomizes a line of reasoning. It is a condensed or even 
diagram-like rendering of the relationship among a set of terms, a relationship that constitutes 
the argument and that could be expressed at greater length (Fahnestock 1999, p. 24). 
 
                                                 
6 Fahnestock also refers tot the discussion about the Latin ornamentum, that also means furniture, 
equipment, which would bring ornament closer to the notion of essential gear and armament than it is 
to adornment. Both interpretations keep the figures on the surface of language, though, as if they could 
easily be removed. 
7 See also the traditional medieval icon for rhetoric as a woman whose dress is decorated with flowers. 
Language is supposed to be the dress of thought, and the figures are the added embroidery (Fahnestock 
1999, p. 18). 
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Arguments that link form and function of the figures can be found all the way 
back to Aristotle, who in Rhetoric, Book III, nowhere claims the figures to be 
emotional, ornamental, or epiphenomenal in any other way. On the contrary, he 
“suggests that certain devices are compelling because they map function onto form or 
perfectly epitomize certain patterns of thought or argument” (Fahnestock 1999, p. 26). 
In his comments on the function of asyndeton and polysyndeton, both adding meaning 
to a text, but also on metaphor, antithesis and energeia he points out the functionality 
of those devices, as they are perfect embodiments of the speaker’s intentions.  
Fahnestock finds more support for her thesis of the constitutive power of the 
figures even in Cicero’s work8. She also sees evidence for a functional approach in 
Hermogenes, Melanchthon, and in work on the enthymeme9 by Thomas Conley10, 
who found that enthymemes were often described as expressions that function as 
“stylistic cappers”. According to Fanhestock, the reasons for the gradual separation of 
the two functions is the confusion caused by the sequences of the rhetorical system, as 
if the different aspects of speech construction represented chronological steps in 
composition. Other reasons are simply the accidents of history, where important 
treatises on rhetoric have been lost forever, and where methods and systems of 
teaching also caused certain subject matters to grow more and more apart. 
Fahnestock mentions more scholarly restaurations that took place in the 
twentieth century. Kenneth Burke “saw to the heart of the ability of the figures to 
express a particular line of argument and simultaneously to induce an audience to 
participate in that argument simply by virtue of their form” (Fahnestock 1999, p. 34). 
Also Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca claimed the argumentative role of 
figures and re-established the link between the figures and argumentation by 
dispersing the figures among the techniques of argumentation (Fahnestock 1999, p. 
36), thus confirming a view of the figures as the epitomes of certain durable lines of 
argument. 
 
3. ANTITHESIS AND CONTROVERSY 
 
Antithesis 
 
All societies value reason and engage in logical arguments, Kennedy (1998) claims in 
his ‘Comparative Rhetoric’, yet the Greek language is strongly antithetical. Greek art 
and mythology abound with contrasting figures such as Prometheus and Epimetheus. 
Binary thinking has been essential in Greek philosophy in concentrating on issues like 
being and non-being, permanence and change. The development of formal logic, with 
the concern for logical contradictions is an important aspect of western society.  
 
It would doubtless be an exaggeration to say that speakers in other cultures do not understand 
logical contradiction, but it is perhaps true that Western contentiousness tends to identify and 
sharpen contradictions. In other cultures, and now in poststructural thought in the west, there is 
a greater inclination to entertain the possibility that two seemingly contradictory statements 
may both be true in some sense; for example, if a term is used metaphorically in one of the 
statements. Yang and yin in Chinese thought are complementaries, not opposites; Mencius’ 
doctrine of multiple definitions is a Chinese example of a different form of reasoning. Western 
                                                 
8 While he characterizes the functions of figures to be illuminating (‘lumina / illuminare’), translations 
give the lighter term ‘embellishment’. 
9 “A stylistic enthymeme is thus that moment in a text when the argument is most directly and 
emphatically expressed by the syntax and word choice” (Fahnestock 1999, p. 30). 
10 Thomas Conley (1984) The enthymeme in perspective. Quarterly Journal of Speech 70 : 168-187. 
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thinking, beginning with the Greeks, has tended to polarize truth and fiction, good and bad, 
body and soul, conservative and liberal, and other such concepts, for the sake of clarity but 
often unnecessarily (Kennedy 1998, p. 206). 
 
Maybe the preference of the media for contradictions is inevitably just a part 
of our culture? Inherent to our language, our way of thinking, not only metaphorically 
in the argument-is-war idea, but also figuratively in the way we like to see things in 
opposition? It’s time to move on now from an exploration of the heuristic possibilities 
of figures in general, to the more specific topic of controversy. It seems appropriate to 
take a closer look at the figure antithesis, for the obvious reason that it carries the idea 
of opposition within its very name. 
Following Fahnestock’s work on antithesis, I start with Aristotle, who sees 
antithesis as one of the basic figures to form a polished prose style, the other two 
being metaphor and energeia. Fahnestock develops the argument that in Aristotelian 
stylistics, dialectic, and rhetoric, “antithesis is a consistent, and consistently important, 
concept, at once a verbal, analytical, and persuasive device” (Fahnestock 1999, p. 53). 
Aristotle’s antithesis11 is “a verbal structure that places contrasted or opposed 
terms in parallel or balanced cola or phrases. Parallel phrasing without opposed terms 
does not produce an antithesis, nor do opposed terms alone without strategic 
positioning in symmetrical phrasing. Instead, the figure antithesis, according to 
Aristotle, must meet both syntactic and semantic requirements” (Fahnestock 1999, p. 
46-47). Furthermore, two types of antithesis are suggested: one based on a single pair 
of opposed terms, and one with two pairs, eg. the wise fail / and the foolish succeed12.  
An important aspect of antithesis seems to be the effect on the audience. “An 
antithesis as a figure of speech at the sentence level builds on these powerful natural 
pairs, the use of one in the first half of the figure creating the expectation of its verbal 
partner in the second half” (Fahnestock 1999, p. 47). Some opposites Fahnestock calls 
“natural”, this means that they are a commonly used pair of opposites in a language; 
some pairs can be more local, and some also temporary, but all of these degrees of 
opposition, can form the semantic base of the figure.  
Antitheses are typically built on contraries13 like good and evil, love and 
hatred, further divided by Aristotle in those that admit intermediates and those that 
don’t. Another way of forming antitheses is by means of contradictions, pairs of 
words that form exhaustive either/or alternatives. It is important to notice that the 
choice of contrary versus contradiction in an antithesis can influence premise-
building as well as potential refutation. A third type of “natural” opposed lexis that 
can be the source for an antithesis are the correlatives: they designate reciprocal or 
complementary relationships, like cause/effect, or sell/buy14. Fahnestock mentions the 
preference of logicians of contradictions over contraries:  
                                                 
11 Fahnestocks definition is based both on Aristotle’s commentary and examples in Book III of 
Rhetoric (Fahnestock 1999, p. 46). 
12 In cola built on contrasted lexis (antikemenei) “opposite lies with opposite or the same is yoked with 
its opposites”. 
13 In the Categories, Aristotle shows how opposition pairs can be formed in four ways: contraries, 
privation/possession, relatives, affirmation/negation (Fahnestock 1999, p. 48). He did not distinguish 
among those four types as he discussed antithesis in Rhetoric (Book III). According to Fahnestock, 
“distinctions among the three major sources of antithesis – contraries, contradictories, and correlatives - 
are important in identifying how the antithesis epitomizes different lines of argument described in Book 
II of the Rhetoric, and they are crucial to the anatomy of dialectical arguments in his Topics” 
(Fahnestock 1999, p. 49). 
14 Aristotle, in one of his examples of antithesis does use the buy/sell correlatives. Aristotle’s fourth 
type of opposition pairs, privation/possession, can easily fall back into one of the other categories. 
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Logicians prefer contradictions over contraries when they talk of opposition, because 
contradictions cancel each other in a way that contraries cannot. […] Contradictions belong to 
this certain world of A and not A. Contraries, on the other hand, can both be true of an object 
if one is looking at it from different perspectives, or at different times, or in different relations 
[…]; the same person can be judged short or tall according to the height of the observer. Or, 
even worse from a logician’s point of view, both of a pair of contrary terms can be avoided 
entirely; a listener can deny that a sound is either loud or soft but maintain instead that it is in 
some unnamed middle between those extremes (Fahnestock 1999, p. 48-49). 
 
Moreover, contradictions form antitheses easily because they invite repetition 
that leads to the construction of parallel or even identical phrases15. The parallel 
syntax of antithesis supports the contrast not only in a visual but also in an aural way. 
This way, antithesis functions both to delight the ear and deliver an argument. 
One of the 28 lines of argument in Rhetoric Book II explains how one topos of 
demonstrative [enthymemes] is that from opposites (ek toon enantioon). Aristotle 
doesn’t use the term antithesis, here, but the characterization of this topos sounds 
familiar enough16. In Topics, Aristotle explains how speakers can lean on ‘reputable’ 
opinions, and how contrasted lexis can be useful in building premise/conclusion pairs 
(Book I, chapter 10). Almost evidently, his examples are constructed antithetically. In 
Book II, chapter 7, Aristotle discusses how pairs of semantic opposites can be 
combined to create either single or double antitheses, and how arguers can use them to 
test a position. Fahnestock concludes: “Once the verbal form, the figure antithesis, is 
recognized as the epitome of an underlying topical reasoning, it becomes possible to 
use the figure itself as a stylistic prompt or frame for invention, though nothing 
perhaps illustrates the difference between the Classical and Renaissance versus the 
contemporary mind-set more than the discomfort that any such notion of purely verbal 
invention produces” (Fahnestock 1999: 51-52). 
Gradually, the double nature of antithesis as the verbal phrasing of a topical 
device gets lost, and its syntactic and semantic components fall apart. Antithesis is 
split up into stylistic aspects, where it is a figure of diction17, and probative aspects, 
where it forms a figure of thought18. Also in the Renaissance tradition and later, 
antithesis continues to lead a double life: the semantics of opposition becomes the 
rationale, and features of the original antithesis are distributed among other figures. 
Fahnestock concludes: “Across the centuries, in texts whose purpose is to explain the 
potential communicative effects of verbal choices, the antithesis gradually loses its 
identity as a frame for premises built on opposed concepts. It metamorphoses into 
other verbal devices that juxtapose semantic oppositions like the oxymoron and, by 
the eighteenth century, the term antithesis also becomes a generalized descriptor for a 
compositional style of balanced phrases, paired against each other but not necessarily 
driven by semantic contrast” (Fahnestock 1999, p. 58). As a whole, definitions of 
                                                 
15 The well known aphorism by Oscar Wilde is a figure from a single pair of contradictions: “There is 
only one thing in the world worse that being talked about, and that is not being talked about” […] 
Wilde could have constructed this antithesis from contraries rather than contradictories, but “the only 
thing worse that being talked about is being ignored” doesn’t sound all that catchy (Fahnestock 1999, p. 
49). 
16 ”one should look to see if the opposite [predicate] is true of the opposite [subject], [thus] refuting the 
argument if it is not, confirming it if it is” (Kennedy, quoted by Fahnestock 1999, p. 51). 
17 Often accompanied by the warning that its predictability destroys its persuasive effect. 
18 first mentioned in the Ad Alexandrum, repeated in the Ad Herennium, and persisting through the 
centuries. 
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antithesis have lost the Aristotelian concept that an argument can be invented through 
stylistic choices, only to feed the contempt for “mere rhetoric”.  
 
Antithesis in science 
 
Yet, the Aristotelian antithesis, like metaphor, is a powerful conceptual tool in the 
framing of arguments. Fahnestock makes a distinction between antithesis in scientific 
argumentation where the opposites employed are already accepted as opposites, and 
argumentation where one pair is pushed into opposition by the other pair within the 
syntactic structure. Francis Bacon was an exemplary user of antithesis in the first 
sense, in using the frame of the figure as a prompt to invent or construct arguments. 
But an arguer can also construct an argument to set terms in a new opposition, so that 
he can make nonce contraries out of terms that were not opposed before to the 
audience. Finally, the nature of an existing opposition can be changed by antitheses; 
this means that an antithesis is shifted to a new one, either with the terms pushed 
further apart so that they mutually exclude each other, or with the terms set as the two 
poles on a connecting continuum.  
The interesting point about this is the function of the audience. The way the 
antithesis is constructed depends on the status the opposed terms have. Already 
accepted contraries can use the antithesis figure as an inventional prompt, as the first 
colon determines the second, and the audience will recognise the contrasts19. But 
antithesis based on accepted contraries can induce a stronger effect, Fahnestock 
claims. Audiences that are familiar both with the figure and with the opposed terms 
can, within the right context, easily understand the whole antithesis when only the 
first half is expressed. “The speaker who says simply, ‘I am tired of words’ inevitably 
calls for deeds without saying so in a culture that lives with a words/deeds and a 
giving up/turning to dichotomy” (Fahnestock 1999, p. 59). 
The power of antitheses using accepted oppositions as inventional prompts can 
be illustrated by Bacon’s use of the figure in Novum Organum. In the Advancement, 
he explicitly claimed that the method of topical invention in rhetoric can be 
transformed into a method of empirical investigation for science20. In his analysis of 
the nature of heat in a series of tables or lists of observations, Bacon extensively 
illustrates the fact that he is arguing from a figure. When one of the terms in a cola has 
different opposites, he is actively looking for possible contraries, contradictions or 
correlatives, or even for switches to single or double antitheses (Fahnestock 1999, p. 
62). “Thus it is possible to say that Bacon’s empirical method of inquiry is in a sense 
figure-driven, and that given his epistemological commitment to the aphorism, he was 
predisposed to package both his arguments and his observations in epitomes such as 
the antithesis. Far from turning his back on the rhetorical tradition, he in fact tapped 
its conceptual resources epitomized in the figures” (Fahnestock 1999, p. 65). 
Also Charles Darwin frequently used antithesis as a figure and as a conceptual 
pattern, but in The expression of the emotions in man and animals (1872), he 
promoted antithesis into a basic theory. Most gestures he managed to explain by their 
                                                 
19 “the very first of the 28 lines of argument in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, based on the system in the Topics 
outlined earlier, is a blueprint for creating an antithesis from such already accepted contrasts: It advises 
the rhetor to consider whether a subject has an opposite (that is an opposite already available in the 
minds of the audience), and if it does, to consider whether an opposite can be claimed of that opposite. 
…” (Fahnestock 1999, p. 59). 
20 About the topical invention in the traditional parts of rhetoric, Bacon writes: “Neither may these 
places serve only to apprompt our invention, but also direct our inquiry” (Fahnestock 1999, p. 60). 
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adaptive usefulness, but some could only be explained as the result of a tendency to 
perform movements of a directly opposite nature. This involuntary tendency he called 
“the principle of antithesis”: some actions are so firmly connected to certain emotions, 
that in a reaction to an opposite emotion, the opposite reaction unconsciously is 
performed. Darwin’s invention, that matches antithetical emotions with antithetical 
gestures, has been prompted by established semantic pairs defining opposite emotions 
(Fahnestock 1999, p. 68). 
 
Trompe l’ oeuil 
 
All experienced users of a language have the ability to perceive antithesis patterns and 
to fulfil its predictions. As such, the form can take on a life of its own: only one set of 
opposed terms can create another set of semantic opposites. This way, language users 
can use this stylistic tool in order to force or fake a double antithesis by combining 
two words that aren’t established antonyms into the right strategic position 
(Fahnestock 1999, p. 69). 
Pascal distrusted this potential in the figure, and compared it to architectural 
trompe l’oeil. Also Aristotle noticed these false antitheses, as they generate the 
possibility to construct other entities such as peoples or nations into opposition. A 
famous example is Thucydides’ reconstruction of the Corinthian’s speech inciting the 
Spartans to go to war with Athens. Existing semantic oppositions are being used as 
wedges, followed by successive predications, thus creating new oppositions between 
the Athenians and the Spartans (Fahnestock 1999, p. 70). 
Indeed, antithesis has often been used in scientific arguments to construct 
terms into a new opposition. It is interesting to see how the debate whether the fossil 
‘bird’ archaeopteryx was a bird or a dinosaur developed by tracing how different 
antitheses were put into play by different authors (Fahnestock 1999, p. 71-72).  
Finally, antitheses can have the more modest goal of reconfiguring the kind of 
opposition represented by a pair of terms, so as to achieve an antithesis of a different 
kind. Fahnestock refers here to the work of the natural language philosopher C.K. 
Ogden, who uses the metaphors scale and cut for Aristotle’s distinction between 
“mediated” and “unmediated” opposition21. Aristotle claimed that only certain pairs 
of contraries (like odd and even), as well as all contradictions of the form A / not A, 
actually excluded intermediates. The classical scholar G.E.R. Lloyd mentioned the 
often neglected fundamental difference, in the earliest fragments of Greek philosophy, 
between pairs of opposed terms that exclude intermediates and those that admit them 
(Fahnestock 1999, p. 72). 
Ogden built on Aristotle’s distinctions by looking for possibilities to combine 
scales and cuts in antitheses in various ways: “It is possible, for example, to think of a 
pair of opposed terms as representing two scales placed end-to-end, meeting at a cut. 
Furthermore, these two scales can acquire direction, moving toward or away from 
each other” (Fahnestock 1999, p. 73). Ogden realized that some opposites were 
culturally established and should be analysed as a very complex network of 
interacting scales, and he was troubled by the fact that non-perceptive adjectives could 
be used to push objects into opposition, causing controversy and distraction. Although 
Ogden mentioned the importance of his work in the whole field of verbal controversy, 
                                                 
21 Later semanticists have adopted this distinction, using the terms ‘gradable’ versus ‘ungraded’ for 
these two kinds of opposition (Fahnestock 1999, p. 72). 
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he stayed away from what he considered too messy a topic. His aim was to establish 
fixed pairs and solid oppositions as language features. 
 
For from a rhetorical point of view, pairs of terms cannot always be fixed as either excluding 
or allowing intermediates. In the stress and play of position-forming, arguers may work to turn 
antitheses based on cuts into those based on scales – which are inherently easier to undo – or 
to turn scalar oppositions into either/or cuts to keep terms separated. Furthermore, the potential 
for adding direction to scales, for moving the position of a cut on a scale, and for combining 
cuts and scales becomes especially fertile ground for the arguer manipulating types of 
opposition. As a semanticist, Ogden wanted to freeze the cut or scale nature paired terms as 
fixed features in a language. To rhetoricians, however, changing or reinforcing the cut/scale 
difference, with all its potential permutations, can be the goal of an argument that works to 
change an audience’s conception of a particular antithetical pair. […] The possibilities of 
arguing a scale into place on one side of a cut or of undoing a cut entirely and replacing it with 
a continuous scale or of rupturing a continuous scale with an unbridgeable chasm – all of these 
may be the result of argument as well as, in Ogden’s view, the starting point of demonstration 
(Fahnestock 1999, p. 74). 
 
Historical and actual debates that have sometimes been characterized by 
competing metaphors can also be described as competition between kinds of 
antithesis, starting from the question whether a particular pair of terms represents a 
mediated or unmediated opposition. The human/ape distinction, for instance, 
involving metaphors like primitive/civilized can also be studied from the perspective 
of the cut/scale opposition. One can look for the kind of evidence (like language/no 
language) that is stressed in the discussion, and in what kind of antithesis it is put.  
Historically, arguments that excluded women from university education were 
categorical, based on anatomical difference between the sexes. Fahnestock examines 
how currently, researchers in brain anatomy and physiology are once again 
constructing the male/female antithesis as an either/or cut rather than as a difference 
in degree on a connected scale (Fahnestock 1999, p. 80). She notices that in 
publications both for experts and for wider audiences, striking antitheses are pushing 
male/female apart. The absolute differences in reproductive organs don’t show in 
brain anatomy, where the differences are based on differences in degree. Original 
researchers often do point out the overlaps22, but secondary reports to wider audiences 
tell a different story.  
What the New York Times reported to be “the first clear evidence that men and 
women can use their brains differently while they are thinking” shows that “the 
popularity of these arguments, the ease with which they move into the mass media, 
comes in part from the fact that they can be epitomized with such striking 
oppositions” (Fahnestock 1999: 81). Where the author of a study of activity 
differences based on PET scans concludes that ‘the brains of men and women are 
fundamentally more similar than different’, the New York Times reports about this in a 
nice antithetical construction were women/recent/symbolic action are opposed to 
men/ancient and primitive/direct action (Fahnestock 1999, p. 85). 
 
 
                                                 
22 But also reporting in an introductory article in the more prestigious Nature shows how the 
male/female dichotomy is stabilized as opposed to a continuum by using a one/both split. Also in 
Science, articles on similar research show this tendency to work towards unmediated antitheses 
between the pair spatial/verbal as it is connected to the pair male/female and the left/right hemispheres 
of the brain; “the results of these correspondences are mutually reinforcing sets of opposites across 
interconnected arguments, female/verbal/left and male/spatial/right” (Fahnestock 1999, p. 84). 
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4. MEDIA AND CONTROVERSY 
 
How can we adapt Fahnestock’s work on antithesis to the field of media and how can 
her insights direct our study of the construction of controversies in media texts? 
Certainly, it can contribute to a careful articulation of general claims about polarizing 
media. 
Fahnestock’s study shows a very widespread choice of texts from many 
spheres and historical periods. Yet, she has chosen the scientific domain as a central 
field of study. This choice for scientific texts to illustrate the devices is motivated by 
different arguments. One of them concerns visual persuasion. Scientists abundantly 
make use of visual figures to make their point, which is all the more interesting for 
rhetoricians, as they can study how those visual figures relate to figures of speech. 
“This consistency between the visual and verbal helps to underscore the fundamental 
conceptual processes expressed by the figures” (Fahnestock, p. xi). This claim opens 
up analysis possibilities where visual illustrations in science and in mass media are 
looked at. Visual arguments both in science and in the media can be compared from 
the many perspectives of controversy: how is the controversy in the text constructed 
vis à vis the visual controversy, and how are textual and visual pairs pushed into 
more, less, or a different opposition?  
The claim on invention and understanding by direct observation that has been 
made by sciences, has been too successful, Fahnestock argues, and it has caused that 
other invention to get neglected. In showing mutual aspects of science and rhetoric, 
she wants to help chip away at the profound division in our culture between science 
and the humanities. In general, media often cherish the so-called scientific position: 
looking for truth and understanding happens by means of objective observation, and 
facts and stories can be reported in neutral language. The idea that style can construct 
argumentation makes it possible to reconsider once more the so-called unbridgeable 
gap between objectivity and subjectivity, so important an issue in media studies. The 
idea that invention is an activity where language and figures can play a constitutive 
role in developing an argument can help to direct the media away from their obsession 
with objectivity, hopefully towards a more reasonable form of neutrality. At the same 
time it can play down prejudices about language and rhetoric.  
Finally, we should mention this other basic concern of rhetoricians: context 
and argumentative situation. More contextual factors are to be brought into play, like 
the kind and amount of agreement that is needed to construct controversy in the first 
place, and the arguer’s position. Scientists and journalists use antithesis in different 
argumentative situations. The role of outsider that is taken by news reporters is to be 
understood in the strive for neutrality. But at the same time, reporting on controversy 
is also some argumentative move by the journalist: she’s implicitly arguing for the 
relevance of the news she’s reporting.  
Rhetoricians can study how controversy is constructed in a text and how 
competing choices of oppositions are put to work, or how oppositions are changed 
into new ones, how cut/scale positions are manoeuvred with to reinforce or diminish 
them, and how false antitheses are constructed. We should put this in its specific 
context and evaluate the use and kind of controversies in relation to the situation, and 
especially the position and authority of the narrator/reporter. 
The notion that style argues opens up possibilities for a careful study of 
controversies. It can be useful in a reconsidering of the fact that conflicts are 
presented in an all too simple way, often justified by the argument that simplicity is a 
service to the public. Conflicts are not “just there”, nor can controversies be 
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considered to be harmless style adornments in order to raise their appeal. They are at 
the same time delivering arguments for decisions about social and political issues.  
 
link to commentary
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